We generalize some recent results developed in static policy games with multiple players, to a dynamic context. We find that the classical theory of economic policy can be usefully applied to a strategic context of difference games: if one player satisfies the Golden Rule, then either all other players' policies are ineffective with respect to the dynamic target variables shared with that player; or no Nash Feedback Equilibrium can exist, unless they all share target values for those variables. We extend those results to the case where there are also non-dynamic targets, to show that policy effectiveness (a Nash equilibrium) can continue to exist if some players satisfy the Golden Rule but target values differ between players in the non-dynamic targets. We demonstrate the practical importance of these results by showing how policy effectiveness (a policy equilibrium) can appear or disappear with small variations in the expectations process or policy rule in a widely used model of monetary policy.
Introduction
The issue of the effectiveness of public policy is central to economic analysis . The initial contributions by Tinbergen, Theil and others stated the conditions for policy effectiveness, both static and dynamic, in a parametric context. In the last two decades a new approach to economic policy problems has developed, immune from the Lucas (1978) critique, which specifically models the strategic interactions between the government, central bank and other agents.
1 However, abstract conditions for policy effectiveness have not been studied in that context until recently. Di Bartolomeo (2004, 2005) provide general conditions for policy ineffectiveness and equilibrium existence in static LQ-games of the kind stated by the classical theory of economic policy, and show how this can be profitably used to define some general properties of policy games.
This paper extends the same line of reasoning to dynamic difference games, and in that context we consider the issue of target independence (as opposed to instrument independence) which has been a point of particular contraversy in monetary policy design. Our approach is to consider the Nash Feedback Equilibrium for LQ-difference games, and derive conditions for policy ineffectiveness and the equilibrium existence for that case. We then demonstrate the usefulness of our results by showing how easily policy effectiveness, or a policy equilibrium, can appear or disappear with small variations in the expectations process or policy rule in a standard model of monetary theory -illustrating, as we do so, how certain variations in the problem can permit or take away the opportunity for policy makers to operate with differing target values for their policy objectives. To do this, we make use of some properties of sparse matrices since nearly all economic models display sparseness.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines basic concepts and introduces a formal framework to describe LQ-difference games. Section 3 derives two theorems stating a sufficient condition for policy ineffectiveness and a necessary condition for the equilibrium existence in the traditional Tinbergen framework. Section 4 provides a formal relaxation of the two theorems for the case of sparse economic systems. Section 5 illustrates the application of our results to one of the most widely used models in monetary theory. The paper ends with some conclusions and some ideas for further research.
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The Basic Setup
We consider the problem where n players try to minimize their individual quadratic criterion.
Each player controls a different set of inputs to a single system, which is described by the following difference equation:
(1) are full-rank matrices describing the system parameters which (for simplicity) are constant.
The criterion player i N ∈ aims to minimize is
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x ∈ » is a vector of target values. For player i , the relevant sub-system of (1) is: The Nash Feedback Equilibrium can now be defined as follows.
Definition (Nash Feedback Equilibrium):
A vector ( ) ( ) ( ) ( Operationally, a feedback strategy means that a contingent rule (dependent on the system's state vector) is provided for each player, and that the rules themselves can be obtained from the backward recursions of dynamic programming (Holly and Hughes Hallett, 1989: 176-179) .
The Golden Rule and the Equilibrium Properties
In order to apply the traditional theory of economic policy to study the properties of Nash Feedback Equilibrium, we first recall the traditional Tinbergen idea of static controllability: 
Definition (Golden
where i P are negative definite symmetric matrices so that there are no redundant targets (and for the sake of simplicity, time indexes are omitted). By using the transition law to eliminate the next period state, the n Bellman equations become:
A Nash Feedback Equilibrium must satisfy the first-order conditions:
which yields the following policy rule:
2 The classical definition of policy ineffectiveness implies that autonomous changes in the policymaker's instruments can have no influence on the targets (Hughes Hallett, 1989) . However that does not allow for the possible blocking moves by other policy players in the game. We therefore adopt a more general definition here. 3 See Gylfason and Lindbeck (1994) . 4 Indeed, we know that the value function must be convex for a solution to exist (see e.g. Basar and Olsder, 1995; Sargent, 1987: 42-48; Dockner et al., 2000) . See also Engwerda (2000a Engwerda ( , 2000b for a more advanced exposition.
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A Generalization: Sparse Economic Systems
We now relax Theorems 1 and 2 in a way which may prove important in economic models , but which is less often observed in physical systems. Most economic models display sparseness. That is to say, when written in structural form, they typically relate each endogenous variable to just one or two other endogenous variables; and then to one or two lagged endogenous variables or control (predetermined) variables. In that case, the structural model from which (1) is derived can be written as (11) ( 1) ( 1) ( ) ( )
where C, D and F i are sparse matrices (predominantly zero matrices, with just a few nonzero elements per row). For the sake of simplicity we assume that all the players share all the target variables (as discussed in the section above, this assumption can be easily relaxed). In that case, the index on matrices A can be removed, as well the second index of the B matrices.
In this situation, (11). This allows us to separate those target variables which are affected directly by dynamic adjustments over time, from those which are not. We get the reordered system: 
A is a square full rank matrix of order l , 21
and where l is the number of target variables in the system that are directly subject to dynamic adjustments (i.e. the rank of C). Hence M−l target variables are not directly subject to dynamic adjustments. They appear in the second sub-vector of ( ) x t . Now we can rework Theorem 2. We get:
Theorem 3 (ineffectiveness and non-neutrality in sparse economies A is of full rank), will be needed to satisfy the replacement for (10) in this case: namely, ( )
is consistent with ( )
That completes the theorem.
An Example
We turn now to some simple examples to illustrate the usefulness of these results in practice.
Consider an economy that can be described by the following well-known model:
Equation (14) is an elaboration of the standard workhorse which has been part of the theory of 
From here we can determine the value of A for this model, using (12). It is (17)). These are all situations that are common in practice. The Bank of England is an example of the first case; the US, or Italy and France in the Euro is an example of the second; and Turkey or many high inflation countries of the third. Now we consider a variant on this example. Suppose, because of data revisions, policy makers recognize that it is difficult to measure the current output gap accurately, and use a more reliable past measure 1 t y − in equation (15) instead. Suppose also that the private sector, perhaps for similar reasons, find that imperfect expectations introduce too much volatility into the system, and find it cheaper to use simple lagged expectations instead:
The model now has no lags in e t π . Solving through (11) and (12), we now get difficult to measure the current output gap reliably, then they will not be able to reach this idealized equilibrium -or indeed any other solution which allows them both to optimize their policies. 
Concluding Remarks

